Summary of the Day:
Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to contest territory across multiple sectors, with Ukrainian forces advancing north of Sudzha. Both sides have made gains within central Vovchansk, while Russian forces achieved advances northeast of Kupyansk and northwest of Kreminna. These movements suggest ongoing tactical maneuvering by both armies in key contested areas.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with North Korean counterpart Choe Son-hui in Moscow, receiving strong affirmations of North Korean support amid Western reports about North Korean troop deployments to Russia. However, analysts suggest these North Korean reinforcements are unlikely to resolve Russia’s long-term manpower challenges, despite Pyongyang’s stated commitment to indefinite support of Russia’s war effort. Separately, the US Department of Defense announced a new $425 million military assistance package for Ukraine.
Patriarch Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate, addressed growing concerns about military brutality by framing it as a “neo-pagan” phenomenon while acknowledging deeper social and ideological divisions within Russian society. Russian authorities continue to identify tensions between ethnic Russians and minority groups as a critical issue. Meanwhile, Russia’s federal censor Roskomnadzor failed to implement its planned deanonymization of social media accounts by the November 1 deadline, while the Defense Ministry launched a new digital system for veterans to verify their status.
Picture of the Day:
Paramedics respond to the injured after a Russian attack on a residential area in Kharkiv. (George Ivanchenko/Anadolu via Getty Images)
Special Report: North Korea
North Korean soldiers have begun deploying alongside Russian forces in Russia’s Kursk Oblast. Ukraine’s intelligence reported that the first units arrived on October 23, after training at bases in Russia’s Far East. South Korea’s intelligence service confirmed that approximately 1,500 North Korean special forces personnel deployed to Russia in early October, with evidence showing troops gathering at facilities in Ussuriysk and Khabarovsk. South Korea estimates that North Korea plans to send a total of 12,000 personnel to Russia. The U.S. Pentagon and White House have confirmed the presence of North Korean troops, and Russian President Putin made indirect comments suggesting the reports are accurate.
Russia and North Korea have taken different approaches to reports of North Korean troops in Russia. North Korea has flatly denied all reports, with its UN representative calling them “groundless rumors” meant to damage North-Korean-Russian relations. However, North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister oddly added that any such deployment would be legal. Meanwhile, Russia hasn’t explicitly denied the reports but instead emphasizes that any cooperation with North Korea is legitimate. These different responses likely reflect their distinct concerns – North Korea wanting to avoid additional sanctions, while Russia tries to prevent South Korea from increasing support to Ukraine.
The Historical Evolution Between Russia and North Korea
Russia and North Korea’s current cooperation stems from Russia’s need to sustain its war in Ukraine, reviving a complex historical relationship. While the Soviet Union was North Korea’s first ally in 1948 and supported it through the Korean War and 1960s, relations cooled when Moscow established diplomatic ties with South Korea in 1990. Putin tried to rebuild ties with North Korea in the 2000s, emphasizing shared anti-Western values. Though Russia previously supported UN sanctions against North Korea’s nuclear program, it has shifted its position since starting the war in Ukraine in 2022.
2022: In late 2022, U.S. intelligence reported growing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia. The relationship began in September when Russia started purchasing millions of rockets and artillery shells from North Korea. By November, North Korea was secretly shipping large quantities of artillery shells to Russia, and in December, completed a direct sale of rockets and missiles to the Wagner Group.
2023: In mid-2023, military cooperation between Russia and North Korea intensified significantly. In July, Russia’s Defense Minister visited North Korea, followed by Kim Jong-un’s first foreign trip since COVID-19 to meet Putin in Russia that September. During this visit, Kim viewed advanced Russian military equipment and received military gifts, violating UN sanctions. By October, North Korea had shipped over 1,000 containers of military equipment to Russia. South Korean intelligence reported that between August and November, North Korea delivered approximately one million artillery rounds to Russia. In exchange, Russia helped North Korea successfully launch a reconnaissance satellite in November. By December 2023, Russia had begun using North Korean ballistic missiles in Ukraine.
2024: Recent developments in Russia-North Korea relations show deepening military and diplomatic ties. In January 2024, North Korea’s Foreign Minister visited Moscow, where Russia expressed gratitude for North Korean support. By February, Russia had released $9 million in frozen North Korean assets. In June, Putin visited North Korea to sign a comprehensive partnership agreement including mutual defense provisions. July saw North Korea preparing to send engineering units to occupied Donetsk City and switching to Russian satellites for TV broadcasts. The partnership expanded to judicial cooperation when Russian and North Korean prosecutors signed an agreement. In October, Ukrainian intelligence reported that a strike near Donetsk City killed six North Korean officers and wounded three soldiers, confirmed by South Korea’s Defense Minister.
In October 2024, Vladimir Putin moved to formalize Russia’s alliance with North Korea by submitting their June strategic partnership agreement to Russia’s parliament (the Duma) for ratification. The Duma approved the agreement on October 24, amid concerns about reports of North Korean troops being sent to Russia. This action officially makes their mutual defense arrangement part of Russian law.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported in October that intelligence shows Russia is training two North Korean brigades, each with 6,000 troops. Earlier in the month, Ukrainian media revealed that a 3,000-person “Special Buryat Battalion” of North Korean soldiers was forming in Russia’s Far East as part of Russia’s airborne forces. US and South Korean officials have also confirmed evidence of North Korean troop movements to Russia.
Implications and Impact on Russian/Ukraine Conflict
Putin’s use of North Korean troops demonstrates his strategy to avoid full domestic mobilization in Russia while sustaining the war effort. Instead of risking domestic unrest through another mandatory draft, Putin is turning to alternative sources like North Korean forces, which could provide up to 12,000 troops. According to Ukrainian intelligence, these North Korean units will initially deploy to Kursk Oblast, where Russia has already moved nearly 50,000 troops from other areas following Ukraine’s August incursion. This deployment would allow Russia to either return some of these troops to Ukraine or avoid pulling additional Russian forces from ongoing operations.
North Korea sees its involvement in Russia’s war as a valuable opportunity to modernize its military, which hasn’t seen large-scale combat since 1953. With 1.2 million active-duty personnel, North Korea’s army has outdated strategies from the 1950s. The current deployment of 12,000 troops to Russia, including elite “Storm Corps” special forces and over 500 officers, gives North Korea a chance to gain modern combat experience against Western-equipped forces. Of particular interest is learning drone warfare, electronic warfare, and updated infantry tactics. This marks North Korea’s largest foreign military deployment, far exceeding its previous small advisory roles in conflicts like the 1973 Yom Kippur War and Syria’s civil war. The experience could help North Korea update its military doctrine for potential future conflicts with South Korea and the United States.
The effectiveness of North Korea’s troops in gaining combat experience may be limited by several factors. Russia’s current tactics of using infantry in frontal assaults, often called “meat assaults,” have led to high casualties and reduced the effectiveness of specialist units. If North Korean troops are used similarly, it could limit their ability to learn valuable battlefield lessons. Additionally, language barriers pose a significant challenge, with only one Korean translator assigned for every 30 North Korean soldiers. Ukrainian intelligence has already reported that 18 North Korean soldiers deserted before seeing combat, suggesting potential morale issues.
North Korea may be using its growing alliance with Russia to reduce its heavy dependence on China, which currently handles over 90% of North Korea’s trade and serves as its main security ally through a 1961 defense treaty. However, the China-North Korea relationship has been strained by China’s past support for UN sanctions against North Korea and its push for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. By strengthening ties with Russia, which has recently declared North Korean denuclearization a “closed issue,” North Korea might be attempting to balance between two major powers – much like it did during the Cold War’s Sino-Soviet split. This strategy could help North Korea gain additional support while reducing China’s influence over its policies.
The growing Russia-North Korea partnership could destabilize the Korean Peninsula and the broader Asia-Pacific region. While China has historically used its influence to restrain North Korea’s aggressive actions and nuclear development, Russia shows less interest in maintaining regional stability. Without China’s moderating influence, and with Russia’s backing, North Korea may become more emboldened to escalate missile tests and aggressive actions toward South Korea. This shift could potentially increase the risk of conflict in the region.
North Korea’s alliance with Russia could accelerate its nuclear weapons program. While their June 2024 agreement officially covers only peaceful nuclear cooperation, Russia has shifted from opposing to enabling North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, vetoing UN sanctions and declaring denuclearization a “closed issue.” The weapons-for-cash deal with Russia, estimated at $1.7-5.5 billion, provides significant funding for North Korea’s $40 billion economy. Additionally, Russia helps North Korea evade sanctions through secret financial networks and provides essential supplies like food and fuel, allowing North Korea to redirect resources to its nuclear program.
The June 2024 Russia-North Korea defense agreement requires each country to assist the other if attacked. North Korea may hope that sending troops to Russia will ensure Russian support in future Korean Peninsula conflicts. However, the agreement’s language, requiring compliance with UN Charter Article 51 and national laws, gives Russia flexibility to avoid unwanted military involvement. While China values North Korean stability, Russia may prefer to use North Korea as a distraction for US forces in Asia without directly engaging in conflict. Notably, while Kim Jong-un called the relationship an “alliance,” Putin avoided using this term.
North Korea’s growing alliance with Russia makes its recent aggressive stance toward South Korea more concerning. In 2024, North Korea has taken hostile actions including declaring South Korea its “principal enemy” in its constitution, destroying border infrastructure, and threatening retaliation over alleged drone incursions. Russia’s support makes these threats more credible because it gives North Korea a major ally, reduces China’s moderating influence, and adds unpredictability to regional dynamics. Unlike China, which tends to avoid military conflicts, Russia has shown a pattern of military aggression in recent decades and might encourage rather than restrain North Korean hostility toward South Korea.
Beyond Ukraine – The March Towards World War
In a concerning development for international justice, Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko approved a draft agreement with Russia that would mutually enforce each other’s court decisions. This arrangement could enable both authoritarian regimes to extend their legal reach beyond their borders, potentially targeting dissidents and critics, while further cementing their alliance in opposition to Western democratic nations.
The lack of progress in securing Azerbaijani gas to replace Russian supplies highlights a critical challenge for global stability. With the Russian-Ukraine gas transit deal expiring in December 2024, Europe faces a strategic vulnerability, particularly in Slovakia, Austria, and Hungary, which remain heavily dependent on Russian energy. This continued reliance on Russian resources could give Moscow significant leverage in international relations, despite Europe’s stated commitment to energy independence. The situation is further complicated by the fact that even alternative Azerbaijani gas would need to transit through Russian territory, potentially maintaining Moscow’s influence over European energy security. This energy dependency could affect European nations’ ability to maintain a united front in supporting Ukraine and opposing Russian aggression, ultimately impacting the balance of power and stability in the region.
Poland’s construction of defensive fortifications along its Russian border marks a significant escalation in NATO-Russia tensions. The $2.5 billion “East Shield” initiative reflects growing concerns about potential military conflict in Eastern Europe, particularly around the strategic Suwalki Gap – a crucial 40-kilometer corridor that, if captured, could isolate the Baltic states from NATO allies. This militarization of borders, while defensive, represents the largest such operation since World War II and signals deteriorating East-West relations. The joint defense effort by Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia highlights NATO’s growing anxiety about Russian aggression beyond Ukraine. The project, combined with accusations of Belarus weaponizing migration and Vladimir Putin’s threats toward NATO countries, underscores the increasing risk of wider regional conflict and the fragility of European peace.
The Path to Peace
In an October 31 interview with Tucker Carlson, former President Donald Trump rejected accusations of being “a friend of Russia,” citing his sanctions against the Nord Stream 2 pipeline as evidence. However, this statement contrasts with his documented history, including his 2022 description of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as “genius” and “savvy,” his acceptance of Putin’s denial of election interference over U.S. intelligence assessments, and reported multiple conversations with Putin after leaving office. As the presidential election approaches, Trump claims he could end Russia’s war in Ukraine within 24 hours if elected. According to the Financial Times, his potential strategy involves freezing the conflict and blocking Ukraine’s NATO membership until Putin leaves power.
Situation On The Land, Sea, and Air in Ukraine
Russia has made its largest territorial gains of 2024 in eastern Ukraine this past week, capturing approximately 200 square kilometers of territory. Russian forces have reportedly taken the town of Selydove and are now targeting Pokrovsk and Kurakhove, which serve as key logistics hubs for Ukrainian forces. Since August, Russia has captured over 1,100 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory, marking a significant increase in their advance despite suffering heavy losses. Ukrainian officials have expressed growing concern about the war’s direction, with their military reporting continued efforts to repel Russian attacks in the Pokrovsk sector.
A Belarusian monitoring group reported that Russian drones entered Belarus near Lyubech prompting a Belarusian fighter jet response. The group noted a sharp increase in such incidents, with Russian drone incursions into Belarus rising from 9 in July to 49 in October 2024.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation – Initiative None
Ukrainian forces made a small advance north of Sudzha in Kursk Oblast moving into southwestern Russkoye Porechnoye. Fighting continues around Korenevo, Novoivanovka, and Plekhovo. While Russian forces claim advances near Kremyanoye, this hasn’t been independently verified. No combat was reported in the Glushkovsky Raion area.
Ukraine conducted widespread drone attacks across Russia, with Russian officials claiming they intercepted 83 drones: 36 in Kursk, 20 in Bryansk, 12 in Crimea, eight in Voronezh, four in Orel, and three in Belgorod. Drones struck a fuel facility in Ufa, Bashkortostan, and an oil depot in Stavropol (Svetlograd), nearly 900 kilometers from Ukraine’s border, where footage showed a fire despite Russian claims of no damage. The attacks caused minor damage to residential buildings in Bryansk and Orel, with one injury reported in Bryansk.
This attack marks a resumption of Ukraine’s campaign against Russian energy infrastructure, which had previously damaged nine major oil refineries and significantly reduced Russia’s fuel production capacity, with the Ufa refinery strike occurring 1,500 kilometers inside Russia. According to a Russian source, Ukrainian forces had also conducted a drone strike against a Russian Podlet radar station near Cape Tarkhankut, Crimea on October 23, with the station reportedly not yet evacuated for repair. The Financial Times reports that Russia and Ukraine have renewed talks about halting mutual strikes on energy facilities. Ukraine has not confirmed these attacks, and the reports cannot be independently verified.
Kharkiv Front – Initiative Russia
Both Ukrainian and Russian forces made small advances in central Vovchansk, northeast of Kharkiv City. Video evidence shows Ukrainian forces captured a Russian position on Zernova Street. Russian forces continued attacks near Lyptsi, within Vovchansk, and near Vovchanski Khutory.
Luhansk Front – Initiative Russia
Russian forces made advances near Kupyansk and Kreminna, specifically in western Petropavlivka and northeastern Terny. Russia confirmed its capture of Kruhlyakivka southeast of Kupyansk. Russian attacks continued across multiple settlements including Kolisnykivka, Zahryzove, Lozova, Berestove, Vyshneve, Druzhelyubivka, Katerynivka, Hrekivka, and in the Serebryanske forest area.
Donetsk Front – Initiative Russia
Russian troops have failed to advance in the contested towns of Chasiv Yar and Toretsk in Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast, according to military spokesperson Anastasia Bobovnikova. While Russia controls part of both towns—about 50-60% of Toretsk and the eastern Kanal neighborhood of Chasiv Yar—the front line has stabilized along the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal. Russian forces are also pushing toward the cities of Kurakhove and Pokrovsk, with the latter serving as a key logistics hub in the region.
Siversk
Russian military activities along the Siversk direction were limited with no confirmed combat operations reported by either side. The only notable mention came from a Russian military blogger, who claimed that the Russian Aerospace Forces are providing daily air support to the 3rd Combined Arms Army’s ground operations in this area.
Chasiv Yar
Russian forces made limited attacks near Chasiv Yar without gaining ground. Ukrainian officials report that Russian forces are using small group tactics, with 2-3 soldiers attacking before taking cover in foxholes and basements. A Chechen commander claimed their forces advanced 3km past the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal and captured part of the Chasiv Yar-Kostyantynivka road. Fighting continues around Chasiv Yar and near Stupochky, with Russian airborne and anti-aircraft units reportedly involved in the operations.
Toretsk
Russian forces continued limited attacks near Toretsk without confirmed advances. While Russia claims to have captured Oleksandropil and Katerynivka near Toretsk, these claims remain unverified. A Ukrainian battalion officer reported that Russian assault rates have decreased as forces rest and replace losses.
Pokrovsk
Russian forces continued attacks near Pokrovsk without confirmed advances. While Russian sources claim progress near Selydove and Vyshneve, these claims lack verification. Fighting continues east of Pokrovsk around Sukha Balka, Hrodivka, Promin, and Myrolyubivka, as well as southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, Novohrodivka, Krutyi Yar, Mykolaivka, and Vyshneve.
Kurakhove
Russian forces reportedly made advances near Kurakhove on November 1, claiming to have moved into Novoselydivka and captured Stepanivka and Ilinka north of Kurakhove, though these claims are unconfirmed. A Ukrainian brigade spokesperson acknowledged difficult conditions but noted prepared defenses in Kurakhove. Fighting continues around Novodmytrivka, Voznesenka, Kreminna Balka, Ostrivske, Vovchenka, and Maksymilyanivka.
Southwest of Donetsk City
Russian forces reportedly advanced near Vuhledar claiming progress around Novoukrainka, Bohoyavlenka, and Trudove, though these claims remain unverified. Fighting continues north of Vuhledar near Dalne; northeast near Antonivka, Katerynivka, and Yelyzavetivka; and northwest near Trudove, Bohoyavlenka, Shakhtarske, and Novoukrainka. Russian Defense Minister Belousov credited the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade with capturing Shakhtarske and Novoukrainka.
Zaporizhia Front – Initiative Russia
Russian forces remain active in western Zaporizhia Oblast, with clashes reported near the settlement of Novodanylivka, north of Robotyne.
Kherson (Dnipro River) Front – Initiative Russia
Russian forces launched limited attacks in eastern Kherson Oblast with no changes to the front line.
Ukraine News
Russia launched a major aerial attack against Ukraine, using 3 cruise missiles and 48 drones. Ukrainian forces intercepted 31 drones across multiple regions and one missile, while 14 drones were lost to countermeasures and 3 entered Belarusian airspace. Falling debris caused damage to civilian buildings in several areas, with significant impacts in Zolotonosha (Cherkasy Oblast), Poltava Oblast, and Odesa City, where a fire station was hit.
Russia launched a record 2,023 strike drones against Ukraine in October alone – nearly 30% of this year’s total drone attacks and 700 more than September’s previous record. While Ukraine’s forces intercepted 1,185 of these drones, successful strikes resulted in civilian casualties, including a 15-year-old girl in Kyiv. Moscow’s shift from missiles to drone warfare may indicate preparation for a larger assault, according to experts at RUSI and the University of Oslo. They suggest Russia could be using drones to map Ukraine’s air defenses and may be planning a comprehensive attack aimed at destroying Ukraine’s electrical grid. This strategic change from using cruise and ballistic missiles to primarily employing Shahed kamikaze drones has raised concerns about an imminent, unprecedented aerial campaign.
Admiral Ihor Voronchenko has been dismissed from his position as chief inspector of Ukraine’s Defense Ministry by Defense Minister Rustem Umerov on October 31. The ministry provided no official reason for his removal. Voronchenko, who served as Ukraine’s Navy commander from 2016 to 2020, was previously deputy commander during Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. While lawmaker Mariana Bezuhla suggested his dismissal was related to a critical report on military training centers that allegedly angered Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, this claim remains unconfirmed. No replacement has been announced.
Ukraine’s Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced that the country will launch a two-year 5G pilot program in three unspecified cities. The project, planned for completion by 2030, will test 5G networks’ compatibility with military technology through collaboration between the National Cybersecurity Coordination Center and Ukrainian State Center for Radio Frequencies. The technology promises data transmission speeds ten times faster than 4G, potentially improving telecommunications despite wartime challenges. The government has modified radio frequency regulations to accommodate this testing, viewing it as a crucial step toward modernizing Ukraine’s communications infrastructure during Russia’s ongoing invasion.
Innocent Victims Of War
The casualty count of civilians in the past 24 hours: (Russian War Crimes)
DEATHS: 3 INJURIES: 70
Two Russian S-400 missiles struck a police station in Kharkiv on November 1, killing police officer Andrii Matvienko and injuring 46 others, including 36 police officers, nine civilians, and one rescue worker. The afternoon attack also damaged 20 residential buildings, utility networks, and 19 vehicles.
A Russian missile struck Odesa, Ukraine, damaging a fire station and vehicles while injuring two first responders.
Russian attacks in Kharkiv Oblast killed a 75-year-old man in Kupiansk, while five men and one woman were injured in strikes on Kharkiv city, Derhachi, and Kucherivka, according to Governor Oleh Syniehubov.
A 78-year-old woman was injured in Russian attacks near Nikopol in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
Russian forces attacked 19 settlements across Kherson Oblast, including Kherson city, killing one person and injuring 13 others.
Russian forces attacked Donetsk Oblast, injuring two people in strikes on the town of Kurakhove and village of Dronivka
The aftermath of the Russian attack against Kharkiv. (State Emergency Service / Telegram)
The aftermath of Russian attack on the city of Odesa in Ukraine’s south. (Prosecutor General’s Office)
Ukraine’s Allies
The US Department of Defense announced a $425 million military aid package for Ukraine that includes Stryker armored personnel carriers, NASAMS air defense munitions, Stinger missiles, HIMARS ammunition, artillery rounds, anti-tank weapons, counter-drone equipment, and various military and medical supplies, which could help address Ukraine’s challenges in equipping and resupplying its brigades; this follows a previous $400 million package announced during Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s Kyiv visit on October 21. Ukrainian President Zelensky indicated that Ukraine has received approximately 10% of a $61 billion aid package approved by Congress, with the assistance coming as Russian forces continue advancing in eastern Ukraine and amid concerns about potential strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure as winter approaches.
Poland is unable to transfer its remaining 14 MiG-29 fighter jets to Ukraine despite Kyiv’s urgent requests and President Zelensky’s public statement on October 31 about undelivered promised jets, according to Polish Foreign Ministry spokesman Pawel Wroński and Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski’s November 1 response. While Poland has already donated 10 MiG-29s and provided over $4 billion in military aid, including more than 300 tanks and various military equipment, it must retain its remaining fighters at the Marbork air base for national defense until NATO allies agree to help patrol Polish airspace; although NATO supports the concept of an allied “air policing operation” like those conducted over the Baltic region, no member state has volunteered for this role. Poland, which has hosted millions of Ukrainian refugees and contributed more to Ukraine relative to its GDP than any other nation, plans to replace its aging MiG-29s with American F-35 fighters, but these won’t arrive until 2026, making immediate transfer of the remaining MiGs impossible without compromising Polish air defense. Despite Poland’s significant support for Ukraine since Russia’s 2022 invasion, this dispute over fighter jet deliveries has created diplomatic tension in their bilateral relationship, as Poland must balance aid with its own security needs as a frontline country facing Russian threats.
Russia News
Patriarch Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, identified the war in Ukraine as Russia’s “most pressing threat” and criticized Russians for ignoring both the conflict and hardships faced by those in border areas near the fighting, specifically calling out those unwilling to sacrifice personal comfort and using entertainment to avoid confronting the war’s reality. Recent Russian opinion polls suggest declining public support for local government and some Kremlin policies, including the Ukraine invasion, though President Putin remains widely supported; most Russians, especially those without personal losses in Ukraine, show indifference to the war, creating a growing divide between affected and unaffected citizens, along with general resistance to further military mobilization, which appears to be concerning Russian leadership.
Patriarch Kirill also addressed growing concerns about brutality in the Russian military, attributing it to the rise of “neo-pagan” influences while defending Christian Russian soldiers; his comments, linked to criticism of Halloween celebrations, appear to be an attempt to explain away reports of military brutality both at the front and among returning soldiers. A growing pattern of violence has been observed among Russian military personnel, particularly former Wagner Group fighters, who have committed brutal acts against fellow Russians, Ukrainian forces, civilians, and their own communities after returning home, a trend expected to worsen as more traumatized soldiers return, especially given Russia’s lack of psychological support for veterans and its increasing militarization of society and institutions.
Russian leaders, including Patriarch Kirill and Security Council Deputy Chair Dmitry Medvedev, have identified ethnic tensions and migration as major internal threats. Medvedev proposed creating “digital migrant profiles” for tracking foreigners. This reflects Putin’s challenging balancing act between appeasing anti-migrant ultranationalists while maintaining access to needed migrant labor for both economic and military purposes.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is planning to attend the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in Malta this December, potentially marking his first visit to an EU country since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While both the EU and U.S. sanctioned Lavrov in February 2022, they avoided imposing travel bans to maintain diplomatic channels. His previous OSCE attendance in North Macedonia sparked boycotts from Ukraine, Poland, and Baltic states. At September’s UN General Assembly, Lavrov warned against attempts to defeat Russia, a nuclear power, calling such efforts a “suicidal escapade.” The visit is scheduled for December 5-6, with Malta confirming the meeting applies to all OSCE members, including Russia.
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has criticized Turkey for supplying military equipment to Ukraine while attempting to act as a mediator in the conflict, according to Turkey’s Hurriyet news outlet on November 1. Despite being a NATO member, Turkey under President Erdogan has maintained a complex position: supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and providing military aid while simultaneously becoming Russia’s largest fossil fuel customer in 2023, importing nearly €42.2 billion in Russian energy. Turkey’s balancing act recently shifted when it quietly stopped exporting U.S.-origin military goods to Russia following pressure from Washington. This stance highlights Turkey’s challenging position between supporting Ukraine while maintaining economic ties with Russia.
Russia is experiencing a dramatic surge in butter prices, rising nearly 25% since early 2024, with some brands increasing by 34% to 239.96 rubles ($2.47). The increase has led to widespread theft, forcing stores to place butter in anti-theft cases typically reserved for luxury items like caviar. The price surge reflects broader economic challenges in Russia, where wartime spending has pushed inflation above 8% and forced the Central Bank to raise interest rates to 19%. Turkey has begun supplying butter to Russia as the Kremlin attempts to minimize the war’s impact on citizens’ daily lives. This situation demonstrates how Russia’s military spending is affecting basic consumer goods, despite government efforts to monitor and control prices.
Russian War Losses (Today/Total)
| Troops +1270
697680 |
Tanks +8
9170 |
Artillery +37
20076 |
Arm. VEH +17
18487 |
Aircraft
369 |
Heli
329 |
Ships
28 |
Russian Mobilization and Defense Industrial Base
Russian Defense Ministry launched a digital system to help veterans and their families verify veteran status online. The new process uses the Unified Portal of State and Municipal Services to provide electronic certificates for accessing state benefits. This change appears to address ongoing complaints about bureaucratic hurdles in veteran registration and aims to support voluntary military recruitment instead of requiring mobilization.
Russia activated its new electronic conscription system on November 1, following a resolution from April 19, 2024. Under this system, military summonses are now distributed electronically and are considered “received” whether or not recipients open them. The system, which was tested in September 2024, replaces the inefficient mobilization process from September 2022. There are concerns that officials might use this digital platform to mislead citizens into military service, as there have been instances of authorities distributing false summonses in the past.
Several Russian regions have dramatically increased military recruitment bonuses to attract volunteers. Chuvashia Republic doubled its signing bonus to one million rubles ($10,178), while Orenburg Oblast raised its bonus to the same amount from 400,000 rubles. Perm Krai is offering 4.52 million rubles ($46,000) for the first year of service, including a 1.5 million ruble signing bonus. In Ufa City, Bashkortostan Republic, officials are offering 500,000-ruble discounts on apartments for those who enlist to fight in Ukraine.
According to the Ukrainian Resistance Center, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov reportedly plans to send 84,000 troops to Ukraine to help address Russia’s military personnel shortages.
Vityaz, a subsidiary of Russia’s main tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod, has rushed production of mesh screens to protect armored vehicles from Ukrainian drones. A Russian military blogger criticized the delayed response, noting that these defensive measures only began in the war’s third year due to bureaucratic delays and outdated protocols.
A Russian source reports that the Defense Ministry is seeking domestic alternatives to American microchips due to sanctions. The Chelyabinsk “Polet” radio plant, part of Rostec, is a year behind in delivering navigation, landing, and flight control systems due to inability to source US components. While two Russian manufacturers have been found to produce alternative microchips, production will take approximately 390 days.
Russia’s Allies
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui in Moscow, where Choe stated that Kim Jong Un has directed North Korea to support Russia’s “holy war” against Ukraine “until the day of victory.” This rhetoric echoes the Russian Orthodox Church’s framing of the invasion as a civilizational struggle and comes amid Western reports of North Korean troops being deployed to Russia. Lavrov noted that Russian-North Korean relations are rapidly developing “in all areas,” following a strategic partnership agreement signed between Moscow and Pyongyang in June, which was ratified by Russia in October.
According to US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, 8,000 North Korean soldiers are currently stationed in Russia’s Kursk Oblast and are expected to join combat operations against Ukraine “in the coming days.” These troops, wearing Russian uniforms, have been trained in artillery, drone operations, infantry tactics, and trench clearing. Ukrainian intelligence reports indicate North Korea has sent nearly 12,000 troops to Russia in total, including 500 officers and three generals. Additionally, North Korea has reportedly supplied Russia with over 1,000 missiles and millions of munitions pieces.
Despite North Korea’s commitment to Russia’s war effort, their troop contribution is unlikely to significantly address Russia’s manpower shortages. U.S. estimates indicate Russia suffers about 1,200 casualties daily (36,000 monthly), while recruiting only 25,000-30,000 new soldiers per month. The 8,000 North Korean troops represent just one week’s worth of typical Russian losses. Estonian Colonel Ants Kiviselg warns that North Korean troops are likely to suffer heavier casualties than Russian forces due to their lack of familiarity with Ukrainian terrain and climate, as they are primarily trained for mountainous warfare. Ukrainian officials also express skepticism about the North Korean troops’ combat effectiveness, citing potential communication problems with Russian forces.
While North Korea likely joined Russia’s war effort to gain modern combat experience, high casualty rates could undermine this goal. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) notes that how Russia deploys North Korean troops will determine whether they can effectively learn and share battlefield lessons. If North Korean forces face similar casualty rates as Russian troops, Kim Jong Un is unlikely to maintain his commitment of forces indefinitely. This development coincides with Russia’s intensified campaign in eastern Donetsk Oblast, where Russian forces are reportedly advancing at rates not seen since the war’s early stages.
Ukrainian President Zelensky has criticized the international community’s passive response to North Korea’s growing military involvement with Russia and their recent ballistic missile test, which stayed airborne for 86 minutes and reached altitudes of 7,000 kilometers. He stated that Ukraine could target North Korean troop concentrations in Russia if given permission to use Western long-range weapons, particularly noting the camps in Kursk Oblast. Zelensky specifically called on China to influence Russia and North Korea. While the UK may reconsider its position on Storm Shadow missiles, the U.S. and Germany remain opposed to allowing long-range strikes on Russian territory, citing escalation risks.
Controlling the Narrative and Russian Propaganda
Russia’s internet regulator, Roskomnadzor, failed to implement its planned November 1 deadline requiring social media accounts with over 10,000 followers to register their identities with the government. When contacted by a Russian military blogger, Roskomnadzor admitted the law was “still in development.” This has drawn criticism from military bloggers, who complained about the government’s attempt to impose strict registration rules without providing clear implementation guidance.
Source Material
Institute for the Study of War – understandingwar.org
The Kyiv Independent – kyivindependent.com
Kyiv Post – kyivpost.com