Russia and India Strengthen Cooperation – Day 867 (July 9, 2024)

Summary of the day: Russian President Putin and Indian Prime Minister Modi issued a joint statement on strengthening cooperation between their countries, with Modi tacitly supporting Russia’s narrative about seeking a peaceful resolution in Ukraine. Putin is intensifying efforts to strengthen relations with non-Western countries, likely emphasizing Russo-Indian cooperation in the SCO and BRICS as part of creating an alternative “Eurasian security architecture.” Meanwhile, some US officials appear to believe Ukraine doesn’t need to liberate all occupied territories to win the war, despite Putin’s clear statements about not accepting any ceasefire short of Ukrainian capitulation. Several investigations, including one by the UN, concluded that a Russian missile struck the Kyiv City Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital on July 8, amid Russian denials. Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against Russian infrastructure in multiple oblasts overnight. In troop movements, Russian forces made confirmed advances southeast of Chasiv Yar, near Avdiivka, and southwest of Donetsk City, while Ukrainian forces advanced north of Kharkiv City. Putin appointed new military prosecutors, likely supporting ongoing military reforms, and Prime Minister Mishustin ordered the reestablishment of the Saratov Higher Artillery Command School.

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Beyond Ukraine – March Towards World War

Russian President Putin and Indian Prime Minister Modi issued a joint statement to strengthen cooperation between their countries. They pledged to increase joint production of military equipment components, establish a technology cooperation working group, and reorient their military cooperation towards joint research and development. Russia is considering a long-term oil supply agreement with India and helping in constructing nuclear power plants. Modi credited Russo-Indian cooperation for helping control inflation and ensure economic stability in India. This meeting highlights Russia’s efforts to strengthen ties with non-Western countries and India’s willingness to deepen its relationship with Russia despite international tensions.

Putin is working to strengthen Russia’s ties with non-Western countries, focusing on cooperation with India through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. He aims to build a new “Eurasian security architecture” using these groups. Putin also visited China, North Korea, and Vietnam to enhance bilateral relations and gain support from these nations.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense reported that Belarusian and Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces conducted parachute training during the ongoing “Attack Falcon” counterterrorism exercises in Belarus. PLA forces arrived in Belarus on July 6 for exercises running from July 8 to 19. The Belarusian Hajun Project noted that this was the first time a PLA aircraft landed at Belarus’ Baranovichi airfield.

Peace Talks

Modi tacitly supported Russia’s narrative of seeking a peaceful resolution to the Ukraine war in exchange for closer economic ties. Putin thanked Modi for his efforts towards peace, while Modi emphasized dialogue over conflict. However, Modi did not position India as a mediator. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed this. Putin has supported mediation by non-Western countries like China and African states, but his conditions for negotiation include Ukraine’s full capitulation. Recently, Putin has rejected third-party mediation efforts.

Some unnamed US officials believe Ukraine can win the war without reclaiming occupied lands, despite Putin’s insistence on Ukrainian capitulation. The New York Times reported on July 9 that these officials think Ukraine can emerge victorious by moving closer to NATO and Europe. However, this view is flawed, as Ukraine’s NATO or EU membership is not guaranteed. Losing occupied territories would compromise Ukraine’s economic viability and defense capability. Putin demands Ukraine withdraw from non-occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia, and abandon NATO aspirations. A ceasefire on Russia’s terms would likely lead to future Russian aggression after regrouping. Putin remains determined to destroy the Ukrainian state.

Situation On The Land, Sea, and Air in Ukraine

The Russian MoD released footage claiming to show an Iskander-M missile strike on a Ukrainian military column near Stetskivka, Sumy Oblast. The strike reportedly targeted a warehouse with artillery ammunition, 20 military vehicles, and up to 65 personnel, but these claims are unverified. Ukrainian officials reported a Russian strike on critical infrastructure in the Stetskivka area overnight on July 7-8.

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Kharkiv Front – Initiative None

Ukrainian forces recently regained positions near and in Hlyboke, north of Kharkiv City, amid ongoing counterattacks in the area. Geolocated footage from July 8 showed Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in Hlyboke, confirming Ukrainian gains. A Russian milblogger reported that Russian forces struggled to repel Ukrainian attacks on hangars north of Hlyboke and lost control of fields west of Hlyboke. Despite claims of Russian forces operating elsewhere, the blogger emphasized the need for Russian defenses in the Kharkiv direction due to insufficient forces for continued offensive operations, blaming poor planning for the shortages.

Russian forces continued their offensive operations around Kharkiv City. The Ukrainian General Staff reported attacks northwest of Kharkiv near Sotnytskyi Kozachok, north near Lyptsi and Hlyboke, and northeast near Starytsya, Tykhe, and Vovchansk. A Ukrainian serviceman noted that Russian forces attacked in civilian clothes, hiding machine guns, which may violate international law.

The Russian Ministry of Defense’s Africa Corps confirmed that some of its units were transferred to Belgorod Oblast and are engaged in combat operations there. The Africa Corps stated its involvement in creating a “buffer zone” on the Ukrainian-Russian border since the early days of the Russian offensive in northern Kharkiv Oblast in May. Reports of Africa Corps and “African mercenaries” fighting in northern Kharkiv emerged in mid- to late-May. The Corps claimed participation in repelling pro-Ukrainian cross-border raids near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast, and Kozinka, Belgorod Oblast in March, alongside Russian forces. They also said their reconnaissance units captured terrorists involved in the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack.

Luhansk Front – Initiative Russia

Russian forces continued their offensive around Kreminna on July 8 and 9 without confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported attacks northwest of Kreminna near Hrekivka, Nevske, and Makiivka, and west of Kreminna near Terny.

Russian sources circulated warnings about a potential Russian breakthrough towards the Oskil River southeast of Kupyansk. Ukrainian military observers Kostyantyn Mashovets and Bohdan Myroshnykov suggested that recent Russian advances near Pishchane could enable this breakthrough. Russian media and bloggers amplified these warnings, with one claiming Russian forces advanced over four kilometers west and three kilometers wide near Pishchane, entering the settlement. However, no visual evidence supports this, and other sources did not confirm the seizure of Pishchane. Reports also indicated Russian advances near Stelmakhivka and attacks near Petropavlivka, Berestove, and Stelmakhivka, with Ukrainian counterattacks near Synkivka.

Donetsk Front – Initiative Russia

Siversk

Russian forces continued their offensive in the Siversk area, targeting Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk), Spirne (southeast of Siversk), and Vyimka, Vesele, and Rozdolivka (south of Siversk).

Chasiv Yar

Russian forces made slight advances southeast of Chasiv Yar amid ongoing fighting. Geolocated footage from July 8 shows the Russian “94th Regiment” advancing in Andriivka during an assault. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov previously stated that the 94th Operational Regiment returned to Ukraine for frontline duty. A Russian milblogger reported advances between Chasiv Yar and Kalynivka. Russian attacks also continued within eastern Chasiv Yar and near Bohdanivka, Hryhorivka, Bila Hora, Klishchiivka, and Andriivka.

Toretsk

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk but did not make confirmed advances. Attacks occurred near Toretsk, and in areas north (Dyliivka), east (Druzhba and Pivnichne), southeast (Pivdenne), and south (Niu York) of Toretsk on. A Russian milblogger reported ongoing fighting on Toretsk’s outskirts, but Ukrainian Colonel Nazar Voloshyn confirmed that Russian forces have not entered the town. Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced by digging tunnels to bypass Ukrainian defenses, which would have otherwise repelled frontal assaults due to heavy fortifications and intense drone activity.

Avdiivka

Russian forces reportedly advanced northwest and west of Avdiivka amid ongoing fighting. The Russian MoD claimed the capture of Yasnobrodivka, west of Avdiivka, which was first reported on June 30. Russian milbloggers reported advances in several areas northwest of Avdiivka, including near Novooleksandrivka, Prohres, Lozuvatske, Yevhenivka, and Novopokrovske. Some sources claimed Ukrainian forces withdrew from positions near Yevhenivka and Novoselivka Persha, though this is unconfirmed. Additionally, Russian forces attacked near Vozdvyzhenka, Timofiivka, Kalynove, Karlivka, Netaylove, Umanske, and Nevelske.

Southwest of Donetsk City

Russian forces made slight advances southwest of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage showed Russian forces moving marginally in fields east of Kostyantynivka. A Russian milblogger reported continued advances near Ikryana Balka, between Vodyane and Kostyantynivka. Russian forces also attacked areas west of Donetsk City, including Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka, and southwest of the city near Paraskoviivka and Vodyane.

Zaporizhia Front – Initiative Russia

Zaporizhia-Donetsk Border Area

Russian forces attacked the Donetsk-Zaporizhia border area near Novosilka, Rivnopil, Urozhaine, and Makarivka, but did not make any confirmed advances.

Zaporizhia Line

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast without confirmed changes to the frontline. Fighting occurred near Robotyne, Verbove, Mala Tokmachka, Novoandriivka, and Shcherbaky. Ukrainian footage from July 8 showed Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian infantry assault near Robotyne.

Kherson (Dnipro River) Front – Initiative None

Fighting continued on the east bank of Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky. A Russian milblogger reported ongoing battles between Russian and Ukrainian forces for control of the islands in the Dnipro River Delta.

Ukraine News

Russian forces conducted a limited missile strike on Poltava and Odesa oblasts. Poltava Oblast Head Filip Pronin reported an unspecified missile hit an industrial site in Poltava. Russian milbloggers claimed Kh-101 cruise missiles struck the Myrhorod Air Base, but this remains unconfirmed by Ukrainian sources. Additionally, Ukraine’s Southern Air Command reported a Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile strike on Odesa Oblast.

Independent investigations, including one by the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), concluded that a Russian missile struck Kyiv’s Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital on July 8, despite Russian denials. The HRMMU stated that the strike was likely caused by a Russian missile. Open-source investigations by Molfar, Bellingcat, and a Ukrainian officer identified the missile as a Russian Kh-101 cruise missile, citing consistent visual evidence. Ukraine convened a UN Security Council meeting, where international officials condemned Russia. Russian officials falsely blamed a Ukrainian air defense missile and denied responsibility. Visual evidence and investigations firmly refute these claims.

Life in Russian-Occupied Ukraine

Russian authorities are deploying Rosgvardia (National Guard) units to occupied Ukraine for law enforcement. On July 7, Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported that plainclothes Rosgvardia personnel arrived in Urzuf, Donetsk Oblast, to patrol beaches from Urzuf to Yalta. These units are reportedly detaining people arbitrarily. The Ukrainian Resistance Center confirmed on July 9 that more Rosgvardia units are arriving to combat Ukrainian partisan activities, classified by the Russian occupation as an “extremist” threat. Rosgvardia units have been used as a military occupation force in Ukraine.

Zaporizhia Oblast occupation authorities have signed an agreement with Rosgvardia to start military training courses in schools in occupied Berdyansk. These courses will teach Ukrainian children the basics of security and anti-terrorist measures. Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov mentioned that a Rosgvardia unit from Makhachkala, Dagestan Republic, will conduct the training. Russian opposition outlet ASTRA reported that similar classes are also being offered in occupied Melitopol and Kostyantynivka. Rosgvardia aims to train these children to build its own mobilization reserve and to police occupied areas in the future.

A Russian insider has obtained documents revealing the Russian occupation administration’s efforts to seize and nationalize private property in occupied Crimea. The documents instruct Russian law enforcement to list individuals and entities associated with “unfriendly” foreign states to confiscate their property. Previously, Crimean authorities seized properties from Ukrainians deemed “undesirable” or “unfriendly” to Russia. According to Kremlin-affiliated outlet Kommersant, over 700 Ukrainian-owned assets have been seized and nationalized, with more expected as legal boundaries expand.

Russian occupation officials have confirmed the forced removal of Ukrainian children from occupied Kherson to an orphanage in occupied Crimea. On July 7, Kherson Oblast deputy governor Tatyana Kuzmich visited the Yolochka orphanage in Simferopol, where children from Kherson have been since October 2022. Kuzmich claimed the children are well cared for and accused Western observers of slander. However, an investigation by Russian opposition outlet Verstka revealed that at least 14 Ukrainian children from Yolochka were put up for adoption by Russian families in Moscow. Russia previously claimed the children were removed for their safety, but international law prohibits the permanent displacement of populations by an occupying power. The children have been separated from their Ukrainian guardians and relatives for nearly two years.

Russia News

Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes on Russian energy and military targets in Belgorod, Kursk, Rostov, Astrakhan, and Volgograd oblasts overnight. Ukrainian intelligence sources said the Security Service (SBU) and Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) targeted the Aktyubinsk military airfield in Astrakhan, an electrical substation in Rostov, and an oil depot in Volgograd. Geolocated footage shows fires at the Rostov substation and Volgograd oil depot. Reports indicate Ukrainian drones also hit electrical substations, a butter factory, gas stations in Kursk, and an electrical plant in Belgorod. Russian sources claimed over 40 drones were launched, with most intercepted.

On July 8, Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed new military prosecutors as part of ongoing military reforms. He named Lieutenant General Sergey Kazakov as military prosecutor of the Russian Joint Group of Forces, replacing Lieutenant General Alexey Naida. Naida was appointed as the military prosecutor of the Leningrad Military District. Other appointments include Major General Konstantin Olkhovatenko for the Central Military District, Major General Igor Kupreev for the Northern Fleet, and Major General Oleg Okorokov for the Black Sea Fleet. Lieutenant General Andrey Popov was previously appointed as military prosecutor of the Moscow Military District on April 8. These changes aim to support long-term reforms and discipline within the Russian military.

Russian Mobilization and Defense Industrial Base

During a private dinner with Modi in Novo-Ogaryovo, Putin may have promised to return Indian volunteers fighting in Ukraine. Indian Foreign Secretary Vinay Kwatra confirmed that Modi pressed for the release of Indian nationals misled into joining the Russian military. Russian officials pledged to discharge these volunteers, with around 35-50 Indians involved and 10 already back in India. Unnamed sources reported Putin’s personal agreement to facilitate their return. The Kremlin did not comment, and their official meeting summary did not mention this discussion.

The recruitment of Indian volunteers into the Russian military is part of the Kremlin’s deceptive campaign to reinforce its frontlines in Ukraine without declaring a general mobilization. In February 2024, Indian officials sought the early discharge of 20 Indians recruited into the Russian military. In March 2022, the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation uncovered a human trafficking network forcing Indian citizens into the Russian army. A video appeal in March 2024 from Indian men in Russia highlighted coercion and threats by Russian officials. Recruiters promised permanent residency in Russia after six months of combat service. This recruitment effort, starting in Spring 2022, involves Russian officials, businessmen, private military companies, and foreign nationals, using false promises and incentives to enlist volunteers from various countries.

On July 8, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree to reopen the Saratov Higher Artillery Command School, which closed in 2003. The school can train up to 6,000 military and civilian personnel. This move is part of efforts to rebuild Russia’s officer corps after significant losses early in the invasion of Ukraine. Similarly, in July 2023, Russia announced the reopening of the Donetsk Higher Combined Arms Command School to bolster the officer cadre and integrate proxy forces into the regular military.

The reopening of the Saratov Higher Artillery Command School led Russian milbloggers to call for a dedicated institute to train electronic warfare (EW) specialists. They argued that the current EW department at the Russian Air Force Academy cannot meet the demand for trained personnel. A separate EW institution would enable more comprehensive training and better collaboration between EW operators and defense companies. One milblogger noted that many Russian military personnel lack the skills to use EW systems effectively, making increased production of these systems ineffective without proper training.

Forbes reported that Russia might be refurbishing older tank models instead of newer T-72 tanks due to the complexity of T-72 automatic loaders, which are difficult to maintain. Citing open-source researchers, Forbes noted that Russian forces have removed 12-37% of T-55, T-62, and T-64 tanks (which lack autoloaders) from storage, compared to only 9% of T-72A/Ural tanks (which have autoloaders). Additionally, 52-79% of T-72B, T-90B/BV, and T-80U/UD tanks, all equipped with autoloaders, have been removed from storage.

Russia’s Allies

Newly-elected Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reaffirmed Iran’s willingness to form a comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia, ensuring continuity of support. During a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 8, Pezeshkian expressed his intent to sign this agreement at the October 2024 BRICS summit. Putin welcomed the close Russo-Iranian relations and expressed readiness for collaboration. Pezeshkian’s stance aligns with former President Ebrahim Raisi’s efforts to strengthen bilateral ties. The Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei continues to control Iran’s foreign policy, indicating no significant changes under Pezeshkian’s presidency.

North Korea’s state news agency reported that a delegation from Kim Il Sung Military University, led by President Kim Kum-chol, departed for Russia. The purpose of the visit was not disclosed. North Korea and Russia have a history of youth exchanges, and North Korea is seeking to increase the number of its students studying in Russia.

Russia and Belarus are strengthening their trade and industrial cooperation. Belarusian Prime Minister Roman Golovchenko announced the successful implementation of 60 Union State initiatives to boost industrial production and technological innovation. They have also adopted a plan to increase independence in technology and science and plan to implement 26 import-substitution projects. During a meeting in Yekaterinburg, Golovchenko revealed that a Belarusian company signed an agreement with the Russian Ural Civil Aviation Plant to jointly design the Osvey light twin-engine aircraft. Trade between Belarus and Sverdlovsk Oblast reached $800 million in 2023 and $365 million so far in 2024.

Russian Narrative and Propaganda

The US Department of Justice (DoJ) released affidavits about several hundred X (formerly Twitter) accounts and domain names used by Russian state media and security services to operate a disinformation bot farm. The DoJ seized two domain names and investigated 986 X accounts linked to an AI-enhanced bot farm created by Russian state media RT and the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). This bot farm used AI to create fake social media profiles posing as Americans to spread pro-Russian messages. The DoJ reported that RT started this bot farm in April 2022, with Kremlin approval and funding in early 2023 to form a private intelligence group for disinformation. US Attorney General Merrick Garland said the DoJ disrupted this “AI-enabled propaganda campaign.” The DoJ highlighted the prevalence of fake social media accounts on X connected to this bot farm, which X then suspended. These accounts spread debunked narratives and Kremlin propaganda, including false claims about the war in Ukraine and a video of Putin discussing the “New World Order.”

The Russian MoD accused Ukraine of violating the Chemical Weapons Convention. This claim is part of a recurring Russian narrative to discredit Ukraine by alleging chemical and biological threats. Russian officials have previously spread debunked claims that Ukraine is developing biological weapons in US- and NATO-funded labs and using these weapons against Russian troops.

Source Material

Institute for the Study of War – understandingwar.org

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