Summary of the day: Ukrainian intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov stated that Western military assistance is arriving in Ukraine but won’t significantly impact the frontline until at least mid to late July 2024. Budanov noted that sufficient US-provided ATACMS missiles could allow Ukraine to strike the Kerch Strait Bridge in Crimea. The Kremlin attempted to link recent Ukrainian strikes in Crimea with a terrorist attack in Dagestan, while trying to maintain a sense of normalcy. The EU adopted new sanctions against Russia and approved military assistance for Ukraine from frozen Russian assets. Ukrainian forces regained lost positions near Vovchansk and Starytsa, while Russian forces advanced near Siversk and Toretsk. Ukrainian President Zelensky replaced the Joint Forces Commander, and the Russian Ministry of Defense proposed changes to military district status. The Kremlin continued efforts to coopt former Wagner Group personnel with a new bill exempting them from criminal responsibility for the June 2023 rebellion.
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Beyond Ukraine – March Towards World War
Russian milbloggers and Kremlin-linked Moldovan politicians are intensifying efforts to influence Moldova’s political landscape, particularly considering Moldova’s recent moves toward EU integration. Claims circulate that Western organizations are using events like a “Youth Forum” to foster pro-EU views and recruit young influencers in Moldova. Additional accusations suggest attempts by the West to infiltrate local political groups. In a related narrative, the Governor of Gagauzia, Yevgenia Gutsul, criticized the Moldovan government for revoking the license of NordGaz, a company purported to supply Gagauzia with discounted gas. This action was portrayed as an attempt to prevent discontent over high gas prices nationwide, although Moldovan authorities had previously suspended NordGaz’s license due to unauthorized supplies, a decision later overturned by a Moldovan court. Gutsul is now seeking a deal with Gazprom for reduced gas prices for Gagauzia.
Russian milbloggers inaccurately portrayed the temporary closure of an Estonian border checkpoint as a provocation against Russia. They claimed that Estonia intended to cause disruptions by allowing a large crowd to gather at the Narva checkpoint, aiming to create congestion at the adjacent Ivangorod checkpoint in Russia. However, the Estonian Police and Border Guard Board (PPA) explained that the Narva pedestrian crossing was closed from June 20 to June 24 due to safety concerns prompted by backups at the Ivangorod checkpoint.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his Belarusian counterpart, Sergei Aleynik, signed a joint statement in Minsk outlining the Union State’s foreign policy goals. The statement highlighted an “unprecedented” level of cooperation and trust between Russia and Belarus, focusing on coordinated responses to external security threats. It emphasized enhancing the roles of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in regional security and supported Belarusian participation in BRICS. Additionally, Lavrov and Aleynik called for collaboration with Eurasian groups like the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), SCO, ASEAN, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to establish a “Greater Eurasian Partnership,” aiming to develop an alternative Eurasian security framework to NATO.
Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin confirmed that trainers from the Wagner Group are still actively training Belarusian military personnel in Belarus. In an interview with state-owned STV, Khrenin highlighted that these trainers are sharing their combat experience with the Belarusian forces.
Situation On The Land, Sea, and Air in Ukraine
Ukrainian intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov stated that Western military assistance is arriving in Ukraine but won’t significantly impact the frontline until mid to late July 2024. While weapons deliveries have increased, the volume remains a concern. Budanov expects the frontline situation to remain difficult for at least a month. First Deputy Defense Minister Ivan Havrylyuk noted that limited US assistance has reduced Russia’s artillery advantage from 7:1 to 5:1. Russian forces are likely trying to make significant gains before Western aid reaches Ukrainian forces at scale.
Budanov stated that sufficient US-provided ATACMS missiles could allow Ukraine to strike the Kerch Strait Bridge, potentially isolating occupied Crimea. This bridge is a crucial ground line of communication for Russian forces, used to transport military resources from Russia to the frontlines. While Russia has reportedly reduced military transport across the bridge, it remains essential for maintaining the occupation of Crimea. Striking the bridge would force Russian forces to rely on a longer route along the Sea of Azov coast, creating vulnerabilities for Ukrainian forces to exploit.
Current US policy allows Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike anywhere within Russian-occupied Ukraine, including the portion of the Kerch Strait Bridge within Ukraine’s recognized borders. Approximately 13 kilometers of the bridge fall within Ukraine’s territorial waters. The Pentagon stated that Ukraine makes its own targeting decisions. The US has previously condemned Russia’s construction of the bridge as a violation of international law and an attempt to solidify its illegal occupation of Crimea.
Ukrainian journalist Yuriy Butusov reported that Ukrainian forces targeted a Russian bus, car, and truck carrying personnel with a HIMARS strike in Burchak, about 78km south of Zaporizhzhia City.
Ukrainian forces reportedly targeted the Russian Center for Long-Range Space Communications near Yevpatoria, western Crimea, with ATACMS on June 23. This facility, critical for Russian space communications and satellite navigation, experienced a significant fire, as shown in satellite imagery and video footage. The site, occupied by Russia since 2014, may also house the Krasukha electronic warfare complex and the Liana electronic intelligence system, which includes satellites used for maritime reconnaissance. This center had been previously struck by Ukrainian forces in December 2023.
Kharkiv Front – Initiative None
Ukrainian forces regained some tactical positions northeast of Kharkiv City. Geolocated footage showed Ukrainian forces engaging Russian troops in northeastern Vovchansk and regaining positions in central Starytsya. Russian milbloggers claimed Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Hlyboke and Lyptsi, and in Vovchansk. Russian forces reportedly continued attacks near and in Vovchansk, with ongoing positional engagements near Hlyboke.
Luhansk Front – Initiative Russia
Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, targeting multiple locations including Synkivka, Pishchane, Stelmakhivka, Kopanky, Hrekivka, Makiivka, Nevske, Torske, and the Serebryanske forest area. Russian milbloggers claimed advances in several areas, but these remain unconfirmed. A Ukrainian journalist reported that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division suffered at least 251 casualties while fighting near Borova between May 12 and June 17. No confirmed changes to the frontline were reported.
Donetsk Front – Initiative Russia
Siversk
Russian forces made an advance in the Siversk direction planting a Russian flag in southeastern Rozdolivka, south of Siversk. Fighting continued in multiple locations around Siversk, including near Verkhnokamyanske to the east, Bilohorivka to the northeast, and Rozdolivka and Vyimka to the south.
Chasiv Yar
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on June 24, with no confirmed frontline changes. Russian milbloggers claimed advances between Chasiv Yar and Kalynivka, and towards the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal from Ivanivske, but these claims lack visual evidence. Fighting continued in and around Chasiv Yar, including the Kanal Microraion, Ivanivske, and Kalynivka.
Toretsk
Russian forces made progress in the Toretsk area of Ukraine, pushing forward in several nearby locations including east of Druzhba, and near Pivnichne, Pivdenne, and Niu York.
Avdiivka
Russian forces reportedly advanced in several areas northwest of Avdiivka, with claims of gains north of Novooleksandrivka and within central Sokil. Despite these claims, no visual evidence has been confirmed. The Ukrainian StratCom reported ongoing heavy fighting in Novooleksandrivka, where Russian control is not complete. Additionally, attacks continued around Avdiivka, including Vozdvyzhenka and Ocheretyne.
Southwest of Donetsk City
Russian forces attacked areas west and southwest of Donetsk City without altering the front line. Ukrainian forces successfully repelled a Russian assault near Pobieda, southwest of Donetsk City. Russian claims of advancements in Krasnohorivka and north of Volodymyrivka lack confirmed visual evidence. Meanwhile, fighting persisted near Heorhiivka, Paraskoviivka, and Kostyantynivka.
Zaporizhia Front – Initiative Russia
Zaporizhia-Donetsk Border Area
Clashes persisted along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblast border with no changes in the front line. Russian forces failed in their attacks near Urozhaine and Staromayorske. Additionally, Russian forces including drone operators, continued operations near Prechystivka, southeast of Velyka Novosilka.
Zaporizhia Line
Russian military actions continued near Mala Tokmachka, northeast of Robotyne, with no changes reported on the front line in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Although some Russian sources noted ongoing positional battles near Robotyne and Verbove, they acknowledged no significant frontline movement. Claims of minor advances near Novopokrovka were also reported. Additionally, Russian reconnaissance warned of effective Ukrainian minefields in the area, and specialized Russian drone operators were active near Komyshuvakha, southeast of Zaporizhzhia City.
Kherson (Dnipro River) Front – Initiative None
Positional battles occurred in the eastern Kherson Oblast near Krynky. A Russian milblogger reported that Russian forces gained control over some islands in the Dnipro River delta after intense fighting. However, the report also mentioned effective counterattacks by small Ukrainian infantry groups, who have an advantage in drone operations in the region.
Ukraine News
Russian forces launched a limited missile attack on Ukraine. In Donetsk Oblast, two Iskander-M ballistic missiles hit Pokrovsk, causing destruction and damage to residential houses. Additionally, two cruise missiles were fired at Odesa Oblast, with Ukrainian forces intercepting one. The strikes in Odesa City targeted civil infrastructure and a warehouse.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Joint Forces Commander Lieutenant General Yuriy Sodol with Brigadier General Andriy Hnatov. No reason was given for Sodol’s dismissal. Hnatov, who has served as deputy commander of the southern theatre since 2022, played key roles in liberating west bank Kherson Oblast and defending Bakhmut in spring 2023.
Russian forces launched a guided glide bomb attack on Kharkiv City, striking an educational institution.
Ukraine’s Allies
The EU adopted its 14th sanctions package against Russia, focusing on Russian influence operations in Europe. The new measures prohibit EU entities, including political parties and media, from accepting Russian funding or support. The EU also suspended broadcasting activities of additional Russian state media outlets, citing their role in propaganda and disinformation campaigns. This decision affects outlets like RIA Novosti, Izvestia, and Rossiyskaya Gazeta. The EU has now suspended 18 Kremlin-backed media outlets since 2022, typically resulting in blocked website access and restrictions on search engines and social media platforms.
The EU’s new sanctions package targets 116 additional individuals and entities related to Russia. It also restricts specific Russian naval vessels and prohibits EU entities from assisting with Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) transshipment operations in EU territory. The package introduces new controls on dual-use goods exports and requires EU companies to implement measures to prevent re-export of goods to Russia.
The EU approved up to 1.4 billion euros (about $1.5 billion) in military assistance for Ukraine, funded by proceeds from frozen Russian assets. Ninety percent of this first payment is for Ukraine’s defense needs, with the remaining 10% supporting rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. Distribution will begin in July 2024 with biannual payments. EU High Commissioner Josep Borrell explained that this assistance bypassed Hungary’s veto through a “legal loophole,” as Hungary had abstained from an earlier vote on setting aside proceeds from frozen Russian assets.
Russia News
The Kremlin introduced a new bill to exempt many former Wagner Group members from criminal responsibility for their participation in the June 2023 armed rebellion. The bill allows exemption if a participant helped prevent further damage to Russian state interests and cooperated with authorities. It also proposes adding a new “Armed Rebellion” article to the Criminal Code, differentiating between levels of involvement. Simultaneously, the government approved a bill to toughen penalties for rebellion organizers or participants if the rebellion resulted in death or other grave consequences. The Kremlin’s bill has three main objectives: appeasing former Wagner personnel, addressing public concerns over casualties during the rebellion, and preventing future armed rebellions. It proposes exempting rebellion participants from criminal charges if they cooperated with authorities, while simultaneously increasing penalties for rebellion organizers if deaths occurred. A Russian milblogger noted that no Wagner commanders or participants were charged for their involvement in the 2023 rebellion, which resulted in 13 Russian pilot deaths. Some milbloggers marked the rebellion’s anniversary by celebrating Wagner’s accomplishments and highlighting persistent problems in the Russian military.
Russian Mobilization and Defense Industrial Base
The Russian Ministry of Defense proposed removing the status of “interservice strategic territorial association” from all Russian military districts, a change equivalent to eliminating joint headquarters in Western military terms. The proposal involves reorganizing joint strategic commands into departments under each military district to streamline command structures. This move accompanies other structural changes, including the division of the Western Military District into Moscow and Leningrad military districts and reassigning the Caspian Flotilla to the Navy. Additionally, the Air Force and Air Defense Forces are now under the Aerospace Forces. These changes were preceded by President Putin’s decrees on February 26, altering the Northern Fleet’s status and establishing the new military districts.
Russian military bloggers continue to criticize battlefield commanders for their poor treatment of personnel and unprofessional conduct. Footage published by a milblogger on June 23 reportedly shows Russian soldiers detained in an unsanitary basement for months. This milblogger and others claim that Russian media conceal the harsh realities of the war and accuse commanders of mistreating soldiers, including those wounded or mobilized, comparing their treatment to that of cattle. They also highlight a shortage of troops and call for further mobilization. Additionally, one letter from a mobilized soldier criticizes the military command for unfair distribution of medals and inadequate care for the wounded, while another blogger suggests commanders prioritize loyalty to maintain their positions. Despite these criticisms, a response from another alleged soldier suggests a reduction in complaints and advises caution in public grievances.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is actively promoting its support for soldiers, highlighting its medical and social services. Deputy Defense Minister Anna Tsivileva announced the opening of a new military-social center in Moscow aimed at providing social support to soldiers. This center will also have branches in each military district. Tsivileva emphasized the need for a comprehensive treatment and rehabilitation approach for personnel injured in Ukraine, including the provision of prostheses, specialized vehicles, and support for reintegration into society.
Russian President Vladimir Putin revised regulations to enable the Federal Security Service (FSB) to participate in selecting conscripts. This update follows a December 2023 law that allowed conscripts to serve in the FSB.
Russian Narrative and Propaganda
Kremlin officials attempted to link Ukrainian strikes on military targets in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, with a likely Islamic State terrorist attack in Dagestan. Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated Putin sympathizes with victims of both events and that investigators will determine if they’re connected. Other Russian officials labeled both as “terrorist attacks,” with some suggesting they might have the same “customers.” Pro-Kremlin bots spread claims on social media that the US and Ukraine organized the Dagestan attack, echoing the Russian Defense Ministry’s accusation about the Sevastopol strike.
The Kremlin’s attempt to link the Ukrainian strike on Sevastopol and the terrorist attack in Dagestan is illogical. The civilian casualties in Crimea resulted from Russia’s interception of an incoming ATACMS missile, not a deliberate Ukrainian targeting decision. The Russian Defense Ministry acknowledged that their air defense caused the Ukrainian missile to deviate and detonate in Sevastopol. A US official confirmed that the intercepted ATACMS missile exploded, causing shrapnel to fall on the beach. Russian officials have provided no evidence for claims of Ukrainian or American involvement in the Dagestan attack.
The Kremlin is trying to maintain an appearance of stability following the Dagestan terror attack. Putin won’t make a special address, unlike his response to the Crocus City Hall attack. Officials claim Russia is different now and united against terrorism, emphasizing the country’s multinational and multireligious harmony. They argue the attack aimed to create discord but assert Russia can effectively resist such conflicts. This stance ignores recent incidents like the October 2023 antisemitic riots in Dagestan, the March 2024 Moscow attack, and frequent counterterrorism operations in the North Caucasus.
Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation reported that Russia is running a disinformation campaign to undermine Ukraine’s nuclear energy development. The campaign, spread by pro-Kremlin media, falsely claims that using American fuel in Ukraine’s Russian-designed nuclear plants risks disaster and predicts that building the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant will result in a Chernobyl-like catastrophe, involving high costs and delays.
Russia continues to indict former Ukrainian officials in absentia, targeting individuals associated with Ukraine’s post-2014 government. Among those recently added to Russia’s wanted list are Pavlo Petrenko and Yuriy Stets, who served as Ukraine’s Ministers of Justice and Information Policy, respectively, from 2014 to 2019. They are accused under Russian law of cruel treatment of POWs and civilians, deportation of civilians, and using prohibited warfare methods. A Moscow court has sentenced both Petrenko and Stets to two months of detention upon their arrest or extradition to Russia. This move is part of Russia’s broader effort to discredit Ukraine and justify its invasion, claiming it is necessary to protect civilians.
Source Material
Institute for the Study of War – understandingwar.org